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A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE SENTENCING APPEALS IN ARKANSAS 




Consider the following: a jury finds a defendant guilty of a Class Y 
felony, which carries a potential sentence of ten to forty years or life in pris-
on on the first offense.1 Because this is Arkansas, the jury hears evidence 
relevant to sentencing. The prosecutor seeks a long term of imprisonment 
and is willing to say and do anything necessary to see it happen. And the 
judge, who does not want to be perceived as being “soft on crime,” lets the 
prosecutor proceed unfettered over the defendant’s vehement objections. 
The jury then deliberates. Before the sentencing phase, the jury was inclined 
to give the defendant the minimum sentence of ten years. After hearing the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, the jury is so fearful that it finds a thirty-year 
sentence more appropriate. On appeal, the defendant raises his objections 
again. No matter how meritorious the defendant’s arguments may be, he will 
not be able to get past one strange rule: “A defendant who has received a 
sentence less than the maximum sentence for the offense cannot show prej-
udice from the sentence itself.”2 Because of this maxim, the most egregious 
prosecutorial misconduct during the sentencing phase may go unchecked if 
the jury sentences the defendant to anything less than the maximum. 
A review of Arkansas case law reveals a lack of logic in adopting this 
rule. Further, Arkansas appears to be unique among the states that use jury 
sentencing in holding that a criminal defendant cannot establish prejudice 
from anything short of a maximum sentence. This brief article will review 
the history of sentencing appeals in Arkansas. It will then compare Arkan-
sas’s current law to other states that have jury sentencing in non-capital cas-
es. Finally, it will present an argument for overruling this precedent and 
adopting a better approach for reviewing allegations of error as it relates to 
the sentence. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas; Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law; 
former law clerk to the Honorable Wendell L. Griffen, Arkansas Court of Appeals and the 
Honorable Waymond M. Brown, Arkansas Court of Appeals. 
 1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018). 
 2. E.g., State v. Franklin, 351 Ark. 131, 142, 89 S.W.3d 865, 870 (2002). 
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II. SENTENCING APPEALS IN THE MID-20TH CENTURY 
Before 1987, the Supreme Court of Arkansas appeared not to require a 
maximum sentence before granting sentencing relief. There are three cases 
from the 1970s involving erroneous application of the habitual offender 
statute, which provides enhanced penalties for multiple offenders. In Rich-
ards v. State,3 the court ruled that the trial court erred by having the jury 
consider an improperly certified out-of-state conviction. This error affected 
the sentence only.4 Therefore, the court gave the Attorney General the 
choice of consenting to the sentence being reduced to the minimum for the 
crime or having the judgment reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial.5 The court cited no cases to support its holding.6 However, it relied on 
Richards in two subsequent cases. In Roach v. State,7 the court ruled that the 
trial court erred in admitting a conviction without proof that the offense was 
punishable by imprisonment in the Arkansas penitentiary. The court reduced 
appellant’s sentence to the minimum “to remove all possibility of any preju-
dicial effect to the appellant.”8 Again, the Attorney General had the choice 
of accepting this sentence or having the case remanded for a new trial.9 
In 1976, the state supreme court considered Rogers v. State.10 There, a 
jury convicted appellant of burglary.11 The State sought to increase his sen-
tence under the habitual offender statute.12 However, the court found that 
two of appellant’s five convictions were inadmissible.13 This rendered the 
relevant subdivision of the habitual offender statute inapplicable.14 The court 
then commented as to the effect on the sentence: 
When cumulated with appellant’s instant conviction the language of s 
43—2328(3) becomes applicable. This section makes mandatory the im-
position of the maximum term of imprisonment, 21 years, against one 
falling within its ambit. It additionally provides that a multiplier may be 
used to lengthen this term, and it is clear that the jury, in sentencing ap-
pellant to a 31 1/2-year term of imprisonment, thus increased the period 
of incarceration by use of this device. However, because we cannot as-
certain beyond speculative persuasion what role the inadmissible convic-
 
 3. Richards v. State, 254 Ark. 760, 498 S.W.2d 1 (1973). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 761, 498 S.W.2d at 2. 
 6. See generally id. 
 7. Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973). 
 8. Id. at 779, 503 S.W.2d at 471. 
 9. Id., 503 S.W. 2d at 471. 
 10. Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976). 
 11. Id. at 233, 538 S.W.2d at 301. 
 12. Id., 538 S.W.2d at 301. 
 13. Id. at 236, 538 S.W.2d at 303. 
 14. Id., 538 S.W.2d at 303. 
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tion played in enhancing appellant’s sentence and because the potential 
for prejudice is thereby engendered, we reduce this sentence to the min-
imum permissible term, or 21 years.
15
 
Again, the Attorney General had the choice of accepting the reduced 
sentence or retrying the appellant.16 
So, the law at this point appeared clear: when there was trial error that 
related to the sentence only, the Supreme Court of Arkansas gave the Attor-
ney General the choice of accepting a modified sentence or retrying the 
case. In addition to the aforementioned cases, this result can be seen in the 
1963 case Osborne v. State,17 where the trial court erroneously refused to 
instruct the jury not to consider a prior bad act for the purposes of enhancing 
an appellant’s sentence; the 1972 case Wilburn v. State,18 where the trial 
court erred in allowing the prosecutor to read into evidence a certified rec-
ord of a prior conviction when that record failed to show that the appellant 
was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel; and the 1985 case 
Meadows v. State,19 where the appellant was convicted of manslaughter of a 
viable fetus, though such was not within the purview of the manslaughter 
statute at the time.20 Language in Meadows is particularly instructive: 
Appellant’s final point is that his conviction for the manslaughter of 
Randy Waldrip must be reversed because of the prejudice caused by the 
evidence adduced in the jointly tried case involving the viable fetus. In-
dubitably, some of the evidence concerning the fetus could have in-
flamed the jury. The State introduced evidence concerning the viability 
of the fetus at various stages of gestation, and then presented detailed ev-
idence about the death of the fetus as a result of “slow asphyxiation” 
caused by a “shearing” of the umbilical cord, much like an astronaut 
might die in outer space if he lost his “lifeline” to his orbiting space ve-
hicle. Under A.R.E. Rule 401, such a vivid and detailed explanation of 
the death of the fetus was neither relevant, nor properly admissible, in 
the Waldrip case. However, the erroneous evidence would not have in-
fluenced the jury on the question of guilt or innocence, but could have 
improperly influenced the jury in fixing the sentence. Because of this 
possible prejudice in the fixing of the sentence, we affirm the judgment 
of conviction but reduce the sentence to the minimum the jury could 
 
 15. Id., 538 S.W.2d at 303. 
 16. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d at 303. 
 17. Osborne v. State, 237 Ark. 5, 237 S.W.2d 170 (1963). 
 18. Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972). 
 19. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987). 
 20. The law has since changed. See Ark. Act 1273 of 1999 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 5-1-102) (expanding the definition of “person,” for the purpose of the homicide statutes, to 
include “a living fetus of twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation.”). 
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have set for the offense of which the appellant was convicted.
21 
 
It also is helpful to consider the 1980 Arkansas Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion in Philmon v. State.22 There the trial court committed two evidentiary 
errors. The court of appeals found that the errors were harmless as it related 
to the appellant’s guilt, but it reduced the appellant’s sentence due to the 
inadmissible evidence possibly influencing the jury on sentencing.23 
III. YOUNG V. STATE AND BUCKLEY V. STATE: A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE 
The change in the law started in 1985 with Young v. State.24 There, the 
appellant was convicted of rape.25 At the time the appellant committed the 
crime, rape was a Class A felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment of 
between five and fifty years. The statute was later amended to make rape a 
Class Y felony, punishable by a term between ten to forty years. In a peti-
tion for post-conviction relief, the appellant argued that the State had im-
properly tried and punished him for a Class Y felony.26 The Supreme Court 
of Arkansas stated that, had the appellant raised the issue, he would have 
been entitled to a jury instruction on rape as a Class A felony.27 But the court 
held that, because his fourteen-year sentence fell within the range for both 
Class A and Class Y felonies, the appellant could not show any prejudice 
from this error.28 The supreme court provided no citation to support the con-
clusion, and nothing in the opinion indicates that the court considered the 
possibility that the jury could have handed down a sentence somewhere be-
tween five and ten years imprisonment (less than the minimum for a Class Y 
felony, but above the then minimum for a Class A felony).
 29 Young still 
represents the starting point for the increased difficulty in appeals from a 
sentence in Arkansas. 
The supreme court relied on Young when reviewing the sentence in 
Buckley v. State.30 There, the appellant had previously received two life sen-
tences for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, but he appealed 
and received a new trial on sentencing.31 The appellant wanted to waive his 
 
 21. Meadows, 291 Ark. at 112, 722 S.W.2d at 587–88. 
 22. Philmon v. State, 267 Ark. 1121, 593 S.W.2d 504 (Ark. App. 1980). 
 23. Id. at 1127, 593 S.W.2d at 508. 
 24. Young v. State, 287 Ark. 361, 699 S.W.2d 398 (1985) (per curiam). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 67, 76 S.W.3d 825, 833–34 (2002). 
 31. Id. at 60, 76 S.W.3d at 829. 
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right to a jury trial, but the State objected, and a new jury sentenced him to 
two consecutive twenty-eight-year terms of imprisonment.32 The appellant 
challenged the trial court’s decision to try him in front of a jury, but the 
supreme court held that the Arkansas Code explicitly authorized such a pro-
cedure.33 After so holding, the court continued: 
Additionally, Buckley cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by be-
ing resentenced by a new jury, because he received a sentence within the 
statutory range, and one that was significantly less than his original sen-
tence. Delivery of a controlled substance is a Class Y felony, . . . which 
carries a sentencing range of ten-to-forty years or life. A defendant who 
has received a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum 
sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. See Young v. 
State, 287 Ark. 361, 699 S.W.2d 398 (1985).
34
 
The appellant also sought review of several evidentiary issues and 
claimed prejudice due to him receiving a sentence greater than the statutory 
minimum. In addition to finding that his claim was not preserved for appel-
late review, the court relied on Young and stated that he still could not show 
prejudice due to being sentenced to less than the maximum. 
Four years later, the supreme court cited Young in Tate v. State.35 
There, the alleged error was introducing pictures depicting the victim’s life 
during the sentencing phase of trial.36 While there is language in the opinion 
suggesting that the court would have ruled against the appellant on the mer-
its of the argument,37 the court declined to review the argument due to the 
appellant receiving a forty-year sentence (less than the maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment for first-degree murder).38 
The supreme court seems steadfast in preserving this rule. In State v. 
Thompson,39 the State sought to reverse post-conviction relief due to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.40 The defendant was convicted of two counts of 
second-degree sexual assault and one count of rape.41 The jury imposed sen-
 
 32. Id., 76 S.W.3d at 829. 
 33. Id. at 69, 76 S.W.3d at 835. 
 34. Id. at 64, 76 S.W.3d at 832 (internal footnote reference and statutory citations omit-
ted). 
 35. Tate v. State, 367 Ark. 576, 242 S.W.3d 254 (2006). 
 36. Id. at 577, 242 S.W.3d at 256. 
 37. “In Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 727, 940 S.W.2d 855 (1997), this court affirmed the trial 
court’s admission of a series of photographs during the penalty phase which was much more 
extensive and detailed than the series in question here[.]” Tate, 367 Ark. at 583, 242 S.W.3d 
at 261. 
 38. Id., 242 S.W.3d at 261. 
 39. State v. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, 510 S.W.3d 775. 
 40. Id. at 1, 510 S.W.3d at 776. 
 41. Id. at 2, 510 S.W.3d at 777. 
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tences that were less than the maximum.42 After the court affirmed the con-
victions on appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief, arguing inef-
fective assistance of counsel.43 Some of the arguments directly related to 
errors during the sentencing phase. The trial court granted the defendant’s 
petition and specifically referenced alleged errors related to the sentence.44 
The supreme court reversed, explaining “We have held that a sentence less 
than the maximum sentence for an offense cannot show prejudice from the 
sentence itself. . . . As appellee was sentenced to less than the maximum on 
all charges, there must be something more than the sentence received in 
order for him to demonstrate prejudice.”45 However, Justice Hart dissented: 
[T]he majority applies a prejudice standard that precludes a defendant 
from establishing prejudice from the sentence itself if the defendant re-
ceives a discretionary sentence of less than the maximum. Again, with-
out knowing what the jury considered, this standard is virtually impossi-
ble to meet. We have never explained our reason for adopting the draco-
nian standard. As one commentator has noted, “The only plausible ex-
planation for these heightened standards is to help dispose of (i.e., deny) 
many ineffective assistance claims.” . . . The United States Supreme 
Court has noted [in Glover v. United States
46
] that its “jurisprudence 
suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment signif-
icance.” . . . Thus, our prejudice standard is in clear tension with Glover. 
Certainly, “nothing in Glover suggests that a non-capital defendant must 
receive the maximum available sentence in order to demonstrate preju-




It is not clear how the supreme court started with the sentencing prob-
lem in Young48 and reached the conclusion that an appellant cannot establish 
prejudice absent a maximum sentence. True, appellate courts do not reverse 
absent a showing of prejudice.49 And because the Arkansas Rules of Evi-
dence protect the sanctity of jury deliberations,50 it would be difficult to 
 
 42. Id., 510 S.W.3d at 777. 
 43. Id. at 1, 510 S.W.3d at 776. 
 44. Id., 510 S.W.3d at 776. 
 45. State v. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, 7–8, 510 S.W.3d at 780. 
 46. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001). 
 47. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, at 12–13, 510 S.W.3d at 782 (Hart, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 48. Young v. State, 287 Ark. 361, 363, 699 S.W.2d 398, 399 (1985) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that there was no prejudicial error when a defendant’s sentence was within both the erro-
neous range given to the jury and the correct range provided under the law). 
 49. See, e.g., Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996). 
 50. See ARK. R. EVID. 606(b) (West, Westlaw through November 1, 2017) (“Upon an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything 
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conclude with reasonable certainty what effect any error would have on the 
jury’s sentencing decision. However, the supreme court has acknowledged 
the obvious when it comes to the State’s introduction of evidence: “Of 
course, it is likely that evidence offered by the state will be prejudicial to an 
accused, or it probably would not be offered.”51 If it is introduced, then it is 
probably prejudicial.52 And if it is prejudicial, then a jury will likely consider 
it when assessing a sentence, as the prosecutor intends. Some may argue that 
the appellate courts should not speculate about the possible effect of an im-
proper argument when that effect could be minimal. But even a minimally 
prejudicial remark by a prosecutor should be considered when determining 
the fairness of a defendant’s sentence. After all, every day that a defendant 
spends in jail counts. 
There have been a few occasions after Young and Buckley when the 
appellate court reversed despite the defendant not being sentenced to the 
maximum. When it comes to the habitual offender statute, the supreme court 
does not require a maximum sentence in order to establish prejudice. In Va-
nesch v. State,53 the State erroneously introduced the appellant’s juvenile 
delinquency record for the purpose of seeking a habitual offender sentencing 
enhancement. The appellant’s sentence was less than the maximum for non-
habitual sentences.54 The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the appellant 
failed to show prejudice, citing the familiar maxim and rejecting the appel-
lant’s reliance on Rogers, previously mentioned in this article.55 But proba-
tion was available for some of the appellant’s offenses, and the supreme 
court explained, “[W]e know that the trial judge in sentencing Vanesch de-
parted from the sentencing grid and sentenced Vanesch as a habitual offend-
er on all three felony counts. We can only speculate what impact the inad-
missible prior juvenile delinquency adjudication played in enhancing Va-
nesch’s sentences.”56 It then remanded the case for resentencing.57 
In addition, the decision to run multiple sentences concurrently or con-
secutively belongs to the trial judge.58 However, the mechanical acceptance 
of the jury’s recommendation without the exercise of discretion is reversible 
 
upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from 
the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith[.]”). 
 51. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 542, 609 S.W.2d 898, 909 (1980); accord Morris v. 
State, 367 Ark. 406, 240 S.W.3d 593 (2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Vanesch v. State, 343 Ark. 381, 37 S.W.3d 196 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 386, 37 S.W.3d at 199. 
 55. See Vanesch v. State, 70 Ark. App. 277, 283, 16 S.W.3d 306, 310–11. Supra Part II. 
 56. Vanesch, 343 Ark. at 390–91, 37 S.W.3d at 202. 
 57. Id. at 391, 37 S.W.3d at 202. 
 58. Lawhon v. State, 327 Ark. 675, 940 S.W.2d 475 (1997) (citing Hadley v. State, 322 
Ark. 472, 910 S.W.2d 675 (1995)). 
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error.59 A defendant need not be sentenced to the maximum in such cases. 
Finally, a sentence must be within the range provided by statute.60 Not only 
is a sentence outside the statutory range reversible error, it is a matter that 
the appellate court must raise sua sponte.61 
Otherwise, the Arkansas appellate courts have held steadfastly to the 
rule that an appellant cannot show prejudice absent a maximum sentence.62 
Most of these cases can be traced back to Tate, Buckley, or Young itself. 
Thus, with every decision involving a defendant sentenced to less than the 
maximum, Arkansas appellate courts compound the unsupported maxim that 
a defendant is not prejudiced by the sentence until the jury gives the maxi-
mum sentence for an offense. 
IV. ARKANSAS IS UNIQUE IN ITS APPROACH 
Arkansas’s requirement of a maximum sentence as a prerequisite is an 
anomaly, when comparing it to the other states that use jury sentencing in 
non-capital cases. Like Arkansas, the states of Kentucky, Missouri, Okla-
homa, Texas, and Virginia have jury sentencing in non-capital cases.63 None 
of them provide the barriers on sentencing appeals that Arkansas courts do. 
A. Kentucky 
Like Arkansas, Kentucky courts require a showing of prejudice before 
remanding a case for resentencing.64 This may be an easy showing in cases 
where the jury gives the defendant a maximum sentence. For example, the 
defendant was able to make such a showing in Blane v. Commonwealth,65 
where the prosecutor introduced evidence of charges that were subsequently 
amended.66 
 
 59. Id. (citing Acklin v. State, 270 Ark. 879, 606 S.W.2d 594 (1980)). 
 60. See, e.g., Barber v. State, 2016 Ark. 54, 482 S.W.3d 314. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Holley v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 557, 444 S.W.3d 889 (alleging an eviden-
tiary error); Stover v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 393, 437 S.W.3d 699 (alleging an evidentiary 
error); Walden v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 307, 419 S.W.3d 746 (alleging an evidentiary error); 
Gill v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 524, 376 S.W.3d 537 (alleging an improper closing argument); 
Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008) (alleging an erroneous jury instruction). 
 63. See Caleb R. Stone, Sentencing Roulette: How Virginia’s Criminal Sentencing Sys-
tem is Imposing an Unconstitutional Trial Penalty that Suppresses the Rights of Criminal 
Defendants to a Jury Trial, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 559 (2014). See also Jenia Iontche-
va, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 314 (2003) (noting that thirteen 
states had jury sentencing in non-capital cases in 1960). 
 64. See KY. R. CRIM. P. 10.26 (West, Westlaw through January 1, 2018). 
 65. Blane v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 140, 151–52 (Ky. 2012). 
 66. The appellant was successful on this argument despite failing to raise it before the 
trial court. Unlike many states and the federal judiciary, Arkansas has no “plain-error” rule, 
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But even when the potential additional time is relatively minimal, the 
Kentucky appellate courts recognize the possibility of prejudice. For exam-
ple, the appellant in Jackson v. Commonwealth67 was sentenced to ten years 
in prison.68 During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor erroneously told the 
jury that the appellant would be eligible for parole after serving fifteen per-
cent of his sentence.69 The Commonwealth argued that the misstatement was 
harmless, as it only amounted to a six-month difference. The Kentucky 
Court of Appeals responded, “we note that while the six-month difference in 
parole eligibility may seem insignificant to the Commonwealth, it is surely 
significant to [the appellant] or anyone else who might have an additional 
six months to serve in prison before being eligible for release.”70 In so hold-
ing, the court relied on the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Robin-
son v. Commonwealth.71 There, the jury heard incorrect testimony regarding 
the use of “good time credits” in calculating parole eligibility.72 When as-
sessing whether this false testimony had any effect on the jury’s decision to 
render the maximum sentence, the court wrote, “We believe it did and, for 
sure, can’t say it didn’t.”73 The court also reversed and remanded for resen-
tencing in Williams v. Commonwealth74 when the prosecutor erroneously 
introduced convictions that were still subject to appeal.75 Such an error af-
fected the defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender.76 And in Offutt 
v. Commonwealth,77 when the jury was not given an instruction on the ap-
pellant’s eligibility for parole, the Supreme Court of Kentucky commented, 
“While we may doubt whether absent the inaccuracy the result would have 
been more favorable to the defendant, we decline to speculate, and conclude 
that resentencing is in order.”78 While many reported appeals in Kentucky 
are from maximum sentences, language from the Kentucky appellate courts 
confirms that the courts are willing to do a true “harmless error” analysis 
 
and exceptions to the requirement of raising the issue before the trial court are rare. See gen-
erally Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). 
 67. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 2011 WL 112427 (Ky. App. Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 68. Id. at *1. 
 69. Id. at *4 (noting that the defendant would not have been eligible until he served 
twenty percent of his sentence). 
 70. Id. at *5. 
 71. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30 (Ky. 2005). 
 72. Id. at 38. The jury was told that the good time credits would be figured into the de-
fendant’s parole eligibility. Id. However, the appellate court explained that a defendant could 
not get credit for that time until he reaches the minimum parole eligibility. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2005). 
 75. Id. at 499. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Offutt v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 815 (Ky. 1990). 
 78. Id. at 817. 
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rather than assume no prejudice results from sentences that are less than the 
maximum. 
B. Missouri 
Missouri also takes a different approach to sentencing appeals, though 
it has some support for its position in Missouri statutory law. In State v. 
Troya,79 the appellant challenged his ten-year sentence, arguing that the trial 
court misunderstood the applicable sentencing range.80 The court thought 
that the applicable range was ten-to-thirty years or life, when in fact it was 
five-to-thirty years or life.81 Granted, the appellant in Troya was sentenced to 
the perceived minimum, while the appellant in Young was not. However, 
Missouri law clearly states: 
A sentence passed on the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due 
process of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the ques-
tion of punishment in light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual 




Missouri courts require a showing of prejudice before reversing a sen-
tence.83 The question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have imposed a lesser sentence but for the erroneously admitted 
[evidence].”84 Further, when it comes to persistent offender status, Missouri 
courts are willing to review it for plain error.85 
Admittedly, there is one Missouri case, State v. Ray,86 where the court 
found that the appellant could not show prejudice in part because he was 
sentenced to less than the maximum.87 However, the court also considered 
that the trial court ruled in the defendant’s favor when the State attempted to 
charge him as a persistent offender.88 
 
 79. State v. Troya, 407 S.W.3d 695 (Mo. App. 2013). 
 80. Id. at 696. 
 81. Id. at 700. 
 82. Id. at 700. But see State v. Bommarito, 856 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Mo. App. 1993) (not-
ing that, even if the court relied on the prosecutor’s erroneous statement of a ten-year mini-
mum rather than a five-year minimum, there was evidence that the court would have still 
sentenced the appellant to the maximum of thirty years). 
 83. State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Mo. 2008). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See State v. Nesbitt, 299 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Mo. App. 2009). 
 86. State v. Ray, 852 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. App. 1993). 
 87. Id. at 170. 
 88. Id. 
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C. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma code explicitly provides for reversals and remand on sen-
tencing errors: 
Upon any appeal of a conviction by the defendant in a noncapital crimi-
nal case, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing 
proceeding only, may set aside the sentence rendered and remand the 
case to the trial court in the jurisdiction in which the defendant was orig-
inally sentenced for resentencing.
89
 
In McIntosh v. State,90 a jury found the defendant guilty of trafficking 
ecstasy.91 The court instructed the jury that the minimum sentence was thirty 
years, and it sentenced the defendant to that minimum.92 The appellate court 
later held that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the mini-
mum was actually twelve years.93 While the court had to conduct a harm-
less-error review, there was no analysis of the maximum sentence: 
In this instance, the erroneous instruction required the jury to sentence 
McIntosh to a term of imprisonment at least eighteen years above the 
minimum sentence prescribed by statute. With nothing but the bare ver-
dict and the fact that the jury imposed the minimum sentence for the 
range it was given, we have no basis to conclude that this jury would 
have imposed the same thirty year sentence had it been properly instruct-
ed on the twelve year minimum. Consequently, we cannot conclude that 
the error was harmless.
94
 
There was no resentencing in this case. Instead, the court modified the 
sentence to twelve years’ imprisonment.95 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled similarly in Ellis v. 
State.96 There, a jury sentenced a robbery defendant to sixty years of impris-
onment after being erroneously instructed of a twenty-year minimum.97 The 
court subsequently reduced the defendant’s sentence to the actual minimum: 
ten years.98 And in Lewallen v. State,99 the appellate court remanded for re-
 
 89. 22 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 929(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018). 
 90. McIntosh v. State, 237 P.3d 800 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010). 
 91. Id. at 801. 
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 93. Id. at 802. 
 94. Id. at 803. 
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 96. Ellis v. State, 749 P.2d 114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
 97. Id. at 115. 
 98. Id. at 116. 
 99. Lewallen v. State, 2016 OK CR 4, 370 P.3d 828. 
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sentencing when the defendant was subjected to a twenty-year minimum 
sentence rather that the correct four-year minimum.100 
One thing that makes these Oklahoma cases persuasive is that the de-
fendants were similarly situated to the defendant in Young, who was sub-
jected to a higher minimum sentence because of an incorrect jury instruc-
tion. Where the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that there was no prejudi-
cial error because the sentence was still within the valid range, Oklahoma 
courts still reviewed the record for harmless error. 
D. Texas 
Texas clearly does not require a maximum sentence before considering 
a sentencing error. For example, in Harding v. State,101 a robbery defendant 
was sentenced to sixty years, far below the maximum range of life impris-
onment.102 The error involved instructions related to parole eligibility.103 In 
reviewing the sentence, the court explained: 
[T]he prosecutor did indeed direct the jury to consider the § 4(a) instruc-
tion—not once but twice—to decide “how are we going to protect socie-
ty against that man.” . . . “[An argument] made in terms tending to in-
duce consideration of the eligibility formula and other teachings of a § 4 
instruction compounds Rose error and may influence the jury in its de-
liberations on punishment.” . . . Certainly such was his stated purpose 
and that “alone or coupled with other indicia in the record” can create 
implications of harm. . . . 
Another indicator is the term of years assessed: “it serves somewhat as a 
barometric measure of other pressures ... likely to influence the jury in 
assessing punishment.” . . . The Houston [1st] Court itself has made the 
point that even without an explanation from counsel jurors are capable of 
calculating effect of what it calls the “one-third rule” and then “fixing a 
term of years to compensate for parole eligibility.” . . . Experience 
proves the point has merit. . . . 
However, in this cause the court seems to take the view that a term of 
sixty years is “mid-range” punishment, thus somehow suggesting 
harmless error. The fact of the matter is that under § 4(a) sixty years is 
the minimum term that must be assessed in order to achieve the maxi-
mum delay in parole eligibility. . . . So, as we demonstrated in Arnold, 
“it is not enough to say that a § 4 instruction made no contribution to 
punishment merely because the term assessed is ‘mid-range’ relative to 
 
 100. Id. at 828–29. 
 101. Harding v. State, 790 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). 
 102. Id. at 639. 
 103. Id. 
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the potential maximum.” . . . The burden is on the State to show beyond 
reasonable doubt that it did not. . . . “The evil to be avoided is the con-
sideration by the jury of parole in assessing punishment.” . . . We con-
clude that a rational appellate court could not determine and declare be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the error in allowing jurors to consider as-
pects of parole law stated in the § 4(a) instruction did not influence the 
jury adversely to appellant in assessing punishment, . . . that it made no 
contribution to punishment assessed against appellant.
104 
In other words, there is no automatic rejection of the appeal simply for 
lack of a maximum sentence.105 True, the burden of proof regarding harm-
less error is different, with the Texas court putting the burden of proof on 
the State to establish harmless error and Arkansas courts normally placing 
that burden on the appellant to show prejudice.106 But the essential point is 
still clear: a sentence far short of the maximum can be prejudicial. 
The decision in Brown v. State107 is likewise instructive. There, the 
prosecutor committed error by comparing the defendant to Jeffrey Dahmer, 
John Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy.108 The defendant was sentenced to sixty 
years; the maximum potential term was life.109 The court acknowledged the 
difficulty in assessing the effect of the prosecutor’s statement: 
In sum, the determination of harm is little more than a matter of educa-
tional guess. What the jurors actually thought persuasive or actually con-
sidered is seldom, if ever, available to us. So, we peruse the record to as-
sess potentialities. And, in assessing the potentialities at bar, we are una-
ble to say that the cumulative effect of each instance of misconduct was 
nil or only slight. It may be that appellant’s acts merited a lengthy prison 
sentence but that is something which the jury below was to decide free of 
1) suggestion about what the court would do if it were levying punish-
ment and 2) allusion to several of the most notorious murderers in recent 
memory. Appellant is not entitled to a perfect trial, but he is entitled to at 
least one tolerably fair.
110
 
In short, harmless-error analysis may be a challenge and may require 
effort, but it can be done even when the defendant is not sentenced to the 
maximum.111 
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E. Virginia 
The harmless-error analysis itself makes Virginia very different from 
Arkansas. If there is an error related to a sentence, the sentence is reversed 
unless it plainly appears that the error did not affect the sentence.112 This is 
the opposite of Arkansas appellate procedure, where the appellant must 
demonstrate prejudice in an appeal. Thus, a defendant who is sentenced to 
less than the maximum has a chance for resentencing in the event of trial 
court error. 
V. A PROPOSAL 
There is no justification for Arkansas’s blanket assumption that a crim-
inal defendant cannot show prejudice if a jury has not given the maximum 
sentence. The logic cannot be found in case law, and it is an approach that is 
unique among the states that use jury sentencing for non-capital offenses. 
One might argue that the rule has been so ingrained in Arkansas juris-
prudence that the Supreme Court of Arkansas should not reverse it. The 
court often reminds litigants that “[t]he policy behind stare decisis is to lend 
predictability and stability to the law.”113 However, there are no reliance 
issues here.114 Presumably, no defendant does anything to induce a jury to 
hand down a sentence any greater than necessary. And no prosecutor bla-
tantly disregards the rules in the hopes that the jury would hand down a stiff 
sentence less than the maximum (or at least one would hope). 
The bar for overcoming the application of stare decisis is high: a show-
ing that “adherence to the principle . . . is manifestly unjust or patently 
wrong.”115 However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has stated, “[W]hen 
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has 
never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable 
command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of 
adherence to the latest decision.”116 The rule that a criminal defendant be 
sentenced to the maximum before being able to show prejudice in the sen-
 
 112. See Webb v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 466, 470, 524 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2000); 
Resio v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 616, 623, 513 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1999). 
 113. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 287, 149 S.W.3d 325, 337 (2004). See 
also Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n Inc., 344 Ark. 627, 641, 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (2001); State 
Office of Child Support Enf’t v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 343, 954 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1997). 
 114. See Franklin v. Healthsource of Ark., 328 Ark. 163, 173–74, 942 S.W.2d 837, 842–
43 (1997) (Imber, J., dissenting) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Parish v. 
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tencing phase of a trial is indeed badly reasoned. No interest is served by 
mechanical application of that rule. 
Some might also argue that a defendant would have difficulty showing 
prejudice unless a jury had sentenced him or her to the maximum. This may 
be true for several reasons. Even in cases that do not involve sentencing, a 
court can only speculate as to the effect that any piece of evidence or argu-
ment may have on a jury. It may be easier to make inferences when the 
question concerns guilt. There are a limited number of choices: guilty, guilty 
on a lesser-included offense, or not guilty. When it comes to sentencing, 
however, the jury has several options. What effect does an inflammatory 
statement from the prosecutor have on a sentence? Could it increase a de-
fendant’s sentence by ten percent? Fifty percent? One hundred percent? 
There is no way to tell. But the difficulty in determining the effect of an 
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence or argument should not lead 
to a blanket rule requiring a maximum sentence as a prerequisite for a show-
ing of prejudice. 
In her dissent in Thompson, mentioned in Part III of this article, Justice 
Hart relied heavily on Professor Hessick’s comments in her article Ineffec-
tive Assistance at Sentencing.117 Professor Hessick has also remarked that 
Arkansas courts “have not provided much of an explanation for the rule.”118 
She offers a few possible reasons for the rule. One of them is a lack of enti-
tlement to any particular sentence within a discretionary sentencing 
scheme.119 If a defendant is not entitled to a particular sentence, then he can-
not show prejudice when appealing from the sentence alone.120 But the pro-
fessor rejects this argument easily; under such circumstances, a defendant 
would not even be able to show prejudice from a maximum sentence.121 On 
its face, that does not seem fair to the defendant. 
Finally, the refusal to review errors for sentences that are less than the 
maximum ignores the significance of every day spent behind bars. This real-
ity was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rosales-
Mireles v. United States.122 The defendant in that case was convicted of ille-
gal reentry into the United States.123 The Probation Office submitted a sen-
tencing report that yielded a sentencing range of seventy-seven to ninety-six 
months.124 Based on that report, the United States District Court for the 
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Western District of Texas sentenced the defendant to seventy-eight 
months.125 However, the Probation Office’s report contained an error that 
affected the calculation of the sentencing range, and a proper calculation 
would have yielded a range of seventy to eighty-seven months.126 Worse yet, 
the defendant did not catch the error before sentencing.127 
The defendant raised the issue before the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. Because this was the first time the defendant 
raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.128 Again, unlike 
Arkansas law, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) allows for review 
of plain error even if not raised at the district court level.129 The Fifth Circuit 
held that it had the discretion to correct the District Court’s error,130 but it 
declined to do so.131 To reverse plain error under federal law, the court must 
hold that “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings.”132 Because the defendant’s seventy-eight-
month sentence fell within the correct sentencing range, the Fifth Circuit 
held that neither the error nor the sentence “would shock the conscience.”133 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the Fifth 
Circuit was too restrictive when it declined to reverse the error.134 While 
much of the Rosales-Mireles holding is inapplicable to Arkansas, due to its 
rejection of a plain-error rule, the Supreme Court provided wise words as it 
relates to a defendant’s sentence. 
”[W]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—
whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct 
range—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error .”. . . In 
other words, an error resulting in a higher range than the Guidelines pro-
vide usually establishes a reasonable probability that a defendant will 
serve a prison sentence that is more than “necessary” to fulfill the pur-
poses of incarceration. . . . “To a prisoner,” this prospect of additional 
“time behind bars is not some theoretical or mathematical concept.” . . . 
“[A]ny amount of actual jail time” is significant, . . . and “ha[s] excep-
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tionally severe consequences for the incarcerated individual [and] for so-
ciety which bears the direct and indirect costs of incarceration.” . . . The 
possibility of additional jail time thus warrants serious consideration in a 
determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b). It is cru-
cial in maintaining public perception of fairness and integrity in the jus-
tice system that courts exhibit regard for fundamental rights and respect 
for prisoners “as people.”
135
 
To summarize, even when considering what might be perceived as a 
relatively short amount of time to someone who is not incarcerated, sentenc-
ing errors involving months in prison ought to be fully considered by the 
appellate court. Arkansas’s rule requiring a maximum sentence before hold-
ing that there could be a showing of prejudice goes against this reality.
 The solution is simple. At its next opportunity, the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas should hold that a defendant could be prejudiced from an error 
related to sentencing even though he or she received a sentence less than the 
maximum. It might be difficult to determine the prejudice resulting from 
any error from sentencing, but the author would recommend the harmless-
error analysis announced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Harris 
v. State136 and applied in sentencing appeals in Enos v. State:137 
[T]he court should examine the source of the error, the nature of the er-
ror, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and its 
probable collateral implications. Further, the court should consider how 
much weight a juror would probably place upon the error. In addition, 
the Court must also determine whether declaring the error harmless 
would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. In summary, the 
reviewing court should focus not on the weight of the other evidence of 
guilt, but rather on whether the error at issue might possibly have preju-
diced the jurors’ decision-making; it should ask not whether the jury 
reached the correct result, but rather whether the jurors were able proper-
ly to apply law to facts in order to reach a verdict. Consequently, the re-
viewing court must focus upon the process and not on the result. In other 
words, a reviewing court must always examine whether the trial was an 
essentially fair one. If the error was of a magnitude that it disrupted the 
juror’s orderly evaluation of the evidence, no matter how overwhelming 
it might have been, then the conviction is tainted. Again, it is the effect 
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As for what to do about a tainted sentence, Arkansas case law already 
provides a solution: if the error affects the sentence only, the appellate court 
can give the Attorney General the choice of accepting the minimum sen-
tence or having the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear: “any amount 
of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”140 Even if an error 
increases a defendant’s time in jail by a few months, that time still matters. 
Current Arkansas appellate jurisprudence fails to acknowledge this reality. 
There is no good reason for holding as a matter of law that a defendant be 
sentenced to the maximum before being able to show prejudice. Further, no 
other state with jury sentencing in non-capital cases has this rule. Simply 
put, it is time for the Supreme Court of Arkansas to eliminate this rule from 
its jurisprudence, thus opening the door for a true review of sentencing er-
rors in Arkansas. 
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